While military protocol requires that POWs provide only Name, rank, serial number, and date of birth (the so-called Big 4), it is naive to think that all detainees, including terrorists, behave in this fashion. We model two different types of games between the interrogator and the detainee. In particular, we compare the Big 4 game to a two-stage game (the Little Fish game) in which the detainee is permitted to reveal low-level information to the interrogator. We also compare the optimal interrogation levels resulting from the two games.
Introduction
The recent events at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo have brought the issue of the appropriate ways to treat and interrogate detainees to the fore. Now, U.S. law (i. One of President Obama's first tasks on coming to office was to issue Executive Order 13491 Ensuring Lawful Interrogations that extended these limitations to the CIA and other agencies. The order does allow certain harsh interrogation methods, but explicitly requires that all persons under the custody of U.S. representatives be treated humanely. 1 Many believe that restrictions on interrogation techniques serve to undermine the ability of the authorities to acquire information that might be vital to national security interests. For example, former Vice-President Dick Cheney launched a recent media campaign arguing that harsh interrogation techniques, such as water-boarding, are vital for the national interest. 2 Of course, some restrictions are necessary because they reflect the sense of society's moral values. Moreover, as evidenced by Abu Ghraib, torture and harsh interrogation practices can backfire in the sense that they can be used as recruiting tools by enemies of the interrogating nation. Yet, the public remains conflicted on the issue. Shortly after the Abu Ghraib photos were released, Newsweek (2005) reported that 44 percent of Americans believe that torture is a justifiable way to obtain important information and that 58 percent support torture as a means to thwart an imminent terrorist attack.
The aim of this paper is to investigate two different interrogation strategies using a game-theoretic framework. In the Big-4 game, the detainee gives only name, rank, serial number, and date of birth. At that point, the interrogator has to decide whether 1 Specifically, EO 13491 states that persons under U.S. control "... shall in all circumstances be treated humanely and shall not be subjected to violence to life and person (including murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture), nor to outrages upon personal dignity (including humiliating and degrading treatment)..." 2 For details see the BBC News (2009) article "Cheney Enters Torture Memo Row" news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8009571.stm.
to question the detainee more intensively in order to extract potentially withheld information. We compare the outcome of this game to that of a two-stage game we call the "Little Fish" game. In the first stage, the detainee actually provides the interrogator with some useful information (i.e., a little fish). In a sense, the detainee gives up a little fish in the organization in order to protect some more valuable information (i.e., a big fish). The interrogator then makes a determination of (1) whether or not the detainee is withholding other important information and (2) whether or not to use more extreme interrogation methods. If the more extreme method is used, the detainee may "crack"
and provide the additional information. In both games, the interrogation process is costly in that it uses the resources of the human intelligence collector (HIC), possibly causes moral outrage, and can make it easier for terrorists to recruit new members.
Although the analysis of terrorist interrogation methods is rather new, our work is complementary that of to several recent papers. Enders and Su (2007) and Baccara and Bar-Isaac (2009) show that terrorists will alter their network structures as the authorities adopt better (or more severe) means of acquiring information about the network. As the authorities become more able obtain information about a network, optimally structured networks will restructure themselves to be more secure. Dresher, Gassebner and Siemers (2010) use a panel of 111 countries and show that terrorism leads to degradation of human rights including the use of torture. Moreover, Regan
(2010) analyzes a data set with 5400 country-year observations and finds that extreme interrogation methods (that can be classified as torture) are "successful" in that they act to reduce terrorism in the subsequent year. Mialon, Mialon and Stinchcombe (2009) and Wantchekon and Healy (1999) explicitly consider some of the negative consequences of torture while, at the same time, indicating that it can be attractive to intelligence officials. In our view, these findings mean that alternative interrogation methods need to be thoroughly examined in order to find attractive, yet effective, alternatives.
In Section 2, we describe some of the legal issues involved with interrogations, some of the techniques used by interrogators, and justify the rationale for the 2-stage game.
In Section 3, we formalize both games and derive the optimal rules for each player.
In Section 4, we show that the Big 4 game may not be optimal for either player or for the overall well-being of the interrogating nation. In Section 5, we show how the intensity level of the interrogation selected by the HIC may not be optimal from a social perspective. In particular, we show how the socially optimal level of intensity must be balanced by such factors as the moral values of the society and the recruiting potential of the terrorists versus the likelihood of obtaining important information. Section 6 contains our concluding remarks. The Appendix shows how the game can be generalized to multiple sender types. build a "rapport" with the detainee so as to enhance his/her willingness to cooperate.
Background
Although not necessarily friendly, the aim is to establish the HIC as a "realistic persona designed to evoke cooperation from the source." The simplest interrogation approach is the direct method, in which the interrogator simply asks straightforward questions.
Although detainees are not required to answer anything more than the so-called Big 4,
(name, rank, serial number, and date of birth), as indicated in Table 1 , this approach is surprisingly effective.
Once the direct approach no longer seems to be effective, the HIC might switch to offering incentives for information. Incentives can be anything from an emotional reward to extra privileges to direct financial payment. Other more intense approaches include playing on the detainee's love of family and country, fears, pride, and/or frustrations.
Under the Geneva Conventions, there are many instances in which it is permissible to trick the detainee into revealing information. In the Establish Your Identity approach, 6 Much of the material in this section comes from U.S. Field Manual 2-22.3.
the detainee is purposely misidentified as a person wanted on serious charges (such as a war crime). In trying to prove his/her identity, the detainee might reveal some important information. However, not all trickery is permitted. For example, under the Geneva Conventions, detainees must be interviewed in their own language. As such, it is not permissible to have the interviewer speak only in the language of a country friendly to the detainee's country in an effort to trick the detainee into thinking he was actually captured by friendly troops. is used by police departments across the country, but requires additional authorization, as well. The most severe of the allowable approaches, Separation, involves prevents the detainee from communicating with other detainees.
The point is that the severity of interrogation is a choice variable. Up to some level of intensity, increasing the severity in stages can result in higher levels of informational revelation.
Lying: In the public media, it is often thought that simply lying to interrogators is 7 Section 5-75 explicitly prohibits (1) forcing the detainee to be naked, perform sexual acts, or pose in a sexual manner, (2) Placing hoods or sacks over the head of a detainee; using duct tape over the eyes, (3) Applying beatings, electric shock, burns, or other forms of physical pain, (4) Waterboarding, (5) using military working dogs, (6) Inducing hypothermia or heat injury, (7) A skilled HIC is trained to be wary of any information that cannot be corroborated. (to which the HIC knows the answer) can be used to check the truthfulness of answers.
As the HIC should not offer anything that is clearly not within his power to give (see Incentive in Table 1 ), detainees cannot realistically provide information unlikely to be known by someone of their rank or location. Similarly, the HIC is trained to look for inconsistencies in the time line of reported events and will carefully seek to elicit the chain of events from the detainee. A good example is provided by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the so-called Christmas Day Bomber (or Underwear Bomber). As reported by the New York Times (2010b), Mr. Abdulmutallab's family persuaded him to provide information concerning his explosives training and the people he worked with in Yemen.
An unnamed federal official is quoted as saying "He's retracing his activities over there [Yemen] . You run to ground what he tells you, validate it and follow up. You build a relationship. It's a pretty standard process."
The Model
We assume that the detainee (i.e., the sender) has a piece of information indexed by , drawn from a finite set Ω = {0 1}. The detainee with information  is also called type  sender. For simplicity, we let one piece of information be of low value and the other be of high value. The value of this information to the HIC (i.e., the receiver) is denoted by () where (0)  (1). The sender's type is not observable to the receiver but the distribution of type is common knowledge. Let   denote the probability that the sender is of type  so that  0 +  1 = 1. If the receiver interrogates the sender, a type  sender will reveal information  with probability . The nature of the model is such that the detainees themselves do not know whether they will "crack" under duress. As such, if an interrogation occurs, (1 − ) percent of the individuals will reveal nothing more, but  percent will reveal all they know. We do not formally consider an intermediate case where a detainee of type 1 cracks and simply reveals information 0. Although senders with a relatively large amount of information may try to conceal themselves, our reading of the interrogation literature indicates that this strategy is not likely to be successful.
Once an individual has cooperated with the interrogator, anecdotal evidence indicates that a competent HIC will often be able to extract all that the detainee knows. Consider, as well as any indirect costs. From a social perspective, the indirect costs would include those arising from any negative publicity surrounding an overly harsh interrogation and the ability of terrorists to use such publicity to their advantage. At this point in the analysis, we assume that the HIC internalizes all direct and indirect costs into  so that  represents the full social cost of the interrogation. As such, if type  is interrogated, the expected payoff to the HIC is () − . Senders who are interrogated are put under duress and may not be able to control the amount of information they reveal to the HIC. We let  denote the psychological and physical costs of being subjected to the interrogation. Detainees are loathe to reveal information but know that they might provide the HIC with () with probability . Without loss of generality, we assume that if type  sender is interrogated, his expected payoff is −() − . 8 
The Big 4 Game
The nature of what we call the Big 4 game is straightforward. The HIC uses the direct method to question detainees. However, at this point in the game, senders abide by the Code of Conduct and do nothing more than provide name, rank, serial number, and date of birth to the interrogator. 9 If the HIC interrogates, the expected value of the game to the HIC is
The HIC will interrogate only if (1) is positive. Since the sender type is not observable, the solutions to this game are corner solutions such that all detainees are either interrogated or no one is interrogated. All else equal, the value of the game to the HIC (and the likelihood of interrogation) increases when:
• the probability of cracking under interrogation, , is high
• the value of either piece of information, (0) and  (1), is high
• the proportion of the population with the low-value information set,  0 , is low
• the cost of interrogation,  is low. 8 It appears that the transfer of intellegence is a zero sum game since the sender loses −() while the receiver gains (). Nothing of substance would be altered of we simply set the cost to the sender equal to  or to  plus a general function of () Our notation is designed to illustrate the point that senders are relectuant to reveal information. 9 Of course, if the detainee violates the Code, he/she is playing the Little Fish Game.
The "Little Fish" Game
In the two-stage game, the detainee is allowed to partially cooperate with the interrogator by revealing some information. Specifically, in period 1, the sender discloses all or part of the information in their possession. Of course, the detainee cannot report more verifiable information than he/she has so that a type 0 individual sends report 0, while a type 1 individual can send report 0 or 1. In stage 2, the HIC can try to force the detainee to report 1 with a costly interrogation technique, or let the detainee go and the game ends. If the detainee who has reported  is not interrogated, his payoff will be −() and the HICs' payoff will be equal to ().
The extensive form of the Little Fish game is depicted in Figure 1 wherein Nature ( ) chooses the sender type (0 or 1) with probabilities  0 and  1 , respectively. Sender type 0 ( 0 ) can send only message 0 ( 0 ) while sender type 1 ( 1 ) can send either message 0 ( 0 ) or message 1 ( 1 ). Since the receiver () cannot observe the sender's type, upon receiving  0 he can choose to accommodate the sender () or to interrogate (). If the receiver chooses , then  determines whether the sender "cracks" with probability  or does not "crack" with probability (1 − ). Note that if the receiver chooses to interrogate a type  sender who sends   , the value of information that the receiver gains is () with certainty. The net payoff for each player is given at each end node of the diagram (sender's payoff, receiver's payoff).
In order to make the game interesting, we want to rule out corner solutions wherein there is no incentive to interrogate or wherein detainee always tries to conceal information. To ensure that the receiver has the incentive to interrogate, we assume that the receiver's perceived cost, , is less than the expected gain from interrogation, i.e.,
Similarly, to ensure that the sender does not always conceal information, we assume that the detainee's cost if interrogated, , is greater than the expected gain from hiding information given that he is interrogated, i.e.,
Together the assumptions embedded in (2) and (3) mean the solution to the Little Fish game entails a mixed strategy. It is obvious that the HIC will not interrogate if the received message is 1. If detainees adopt a separating strategy, i.e., type 0 sender reports 0 and type 1 reports 1, the receiver will not interrogate, and type 1 sender will have an incentive to deviate. Similarly, if both types pool on 0, the receiver will interrogate upon receiving message 0 and type 1 sender will again have an incentive to deviate. Hence, there is no pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium. 10 Now consider a mixed strategy such that type 1 detainees sometimes try to conceal information by sending report 0. Let  = [  ] denote the set of probabilities that a detainee who knows  actually reports . Since a type 0 sender in the Little Fish game will always report 0, it follows that  00 = 1, and  01 = 0. A type 1 sender may report either 0 or 1 so that  10 +  11 = 1. The HIC will pursue a mixed strategy as well. Let   denote the probability that a detainee who reports  is interrogated and let   denote the HIC's perceived probability that the detainee is of type  given that his report is .
Hence, the receiver's mixed strategy is
Type  sender's expected payoff from reporting  ≤  is 11
Since a type 0 sender cannot report 1, upon receiving report 1, the receiver knows with probability 1 that the sender is of type 1. Therefore,  01 = 0 and  11 = 1. The expected payoff to the HIC who has received report 0 and interrogates the sender,  0 , is 12
10 In other words, there is not a conjectually consistent pure strategy that entails an equilibrium.
Banks, Grove, Ito, and Toivanen (2006) find a similar result using a very different type of model. . 12 Note that (5) can also be written as the certain value receiving report 0 plus the probability that the individual reporting 0 is actually of type 1 multiplied by the probability that the individual cracks and reveals the value of the extra information (1) − (0) less the cost of the interrogation. Hence,
Our goal is to find a profile of strategies and beliefs {  } that constitutes a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. As such, we need to solve for the following three parameters:
 0 ,  10 , and  10 . Although the algebra gets a bit messy, the solution methodology is straightforward. In order for a type 1 detainee to mix his actions, on the margin, he must be indifferent between reporting 0 an reporting 1. Hence, in equilibrium, it must be the case that  10 =  11 :
and hence,
Notice that the probability of interrogating a detainee reporting 0 is such that:  0  0 because (1)  (0) and  0  1 because of (3). Also note that (7) describes the essential difference between the two types of games. In the Big 4 game, a report of 0 by a type 1 sender signals that he/she is weak. In the Little Fish game, if the sender reports 0, the probability of further interrogation is positively related to the informational differential value of the two pieces of information: (1) − (0). Hence, by providing information on the little fish, the incentive for the HIC to extract the additional information is reduced.
According to (7), the HIC tends to interrogate the detainee who reports 0
• when the differential value of information, (1) − (0), is high
• when the probability of cracking, , is low
• when the sender's cost of interrogation, , is low
For the receiver to mix his actions given a report of 0, in equilibrium, he must be indifferent between interrogating and not interrogating. In order for  0 to equal the payoff from not interrogating and obtaining the sure return (0) it must be the case that
Using Bayes' rule, we have  10 =  10  1 ( 0 +  10  1 ) and  00 = 1 −  10 . Therefore,
and the probability that a detainee that knows 1 and reports 0 is given by
We find that  10 ∈ (0 1) because of (2). Notice that (10) indicates that a detainee that knows 1 will tend to report 0
• when the differential value of information, (1) − (0), is low
• when the cost of interrogation, , is high
• when the proportion of type 0 senders,  0 , is high Finally, the probability that a sender who reports 0 is actually of type 1 is
Note that (7), (10), and (11) constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The equilibrium is necessarily an interior solution and it is unique.
Expected Utility Comparisons

Receiver's Expected Net Benefit
Given the solutions for the two different games, it is possible to compare them in terms of the expected benefits to each player. In order to keep the notation as simple as possible, we define ∆ = (1) − (0) so that (1), the expected net benefit of the Big 4 game to the HIC, can be written as
In the 2-stage Little Fish game, the analysis is somewhat more complicated because the players use mixed strategies. In the first stage, type 0 senders always report 0 and  11 percent of type 1 senders report 1 so that this portion of the expected payoff to the HIC is  0 (0) +  1  11 (1) The net benefit must also account for the  10 percent of the type 
or, on simplifying
Using (7), (10), and the fact that  11 = 1 −  10 , (13) can be written as
Hence, the net benefit to the HIC is greatest when
• the proportion of individuals with type 1 information,  1 , is high
• the costs of interrogation, , are low
• the probability of cracking, , is high
• (0) is large for a given ∆ and when ∆ is large for a given (0).
The difference between the net expected payoffs in the two games, (12) - (14), is
which is always negative because of (2).
Hence, the HIC always prefers the 2-stage game. This result is quite intuitive since the two-stages of the game do not in any way constrain the interrogator's behavior.
Since the interrogator receives (0) at no cost, the interrogator is necessarily better off in the Little Fish game. Figures 2 and 3 provide a sense of the sensitivity of (15) to the parameters of the model. In Figure 2 , we plot the values of (15) for various values of  and (1) holding (0)  1   and  constant. 13 It should be clear that as ∆ increases from 2 to 10 for a given (0) [i.e., increasing  (1)] the relative value of the Little Fish increases as differential becomes more negative. Increasing , however, has a U-shaped effect on the relative value of the games. Figure 3 indicates that the relative desirability of the Little Fish game to the HIC decreases in , and is independent of changes in  (as 15 does not contain ). Recall from (10), when ∆ = (1) − (0) low and when  is large, the proportion of detainees who know 1 and report 0 (i.e.,  10 ) is large. Hence, the HIC tends not to receive the more valuable report in the Little Fish game when ∆ is low or when  is large.
Sender's Expected Net Loss
To a type  sender, the expected loss in the Big 4 game is the probability of cracking and revealing  plus the cost of the duress of the interrogation. Thus, the expected loss to the randomly selected detainee is
Analogously to (13) , the expected loss to senders in the Little Fish game is
As such, using (7), (10), and the fact that  11 = 1−  10 , the differential loss comparison between the two games in equilibrium, (16)- (17), can be shown to be
The sign is ambiguous so that the sender, as well as the interrogator, may prefer the 2-stage game. To explain, providing the interrogator with some information in the 13 In all of our figures, we set (0) = 0 and  1 = 025. Figure 1 sets  = 1 and  = 01. In Figure 1 , the range of ∆ and  are such that  1 ∆ −  is always positive. In Figure 2 , the range of  and  are such that  1 ∆ −  is always positive. 14 Of course, the loss to a type 0 detainee is (0) +  and the loss to a type 1 detainee is (1) + .
As such, the loss to the randomly selected detainee is given by  0 (0) +  1 (1) +  first stage acts as a disincentive to interrogate. The key point is that the additional information provided by the interrogation can be no greater than (1) − (0). Thus, providing the HIC with the little fish can serve to protect the big fish since the HIC may not find it worthwhile to pursue the investigation further.
Two special cases can provide some insight into (18). If we let  = 1, (18) can be written as
which is positive. The expected disutility of the sender is greater in the Big 4 game and hence the sender prefers the 2-stage game when  is large. After all, if the probability of cracking under interrogation is large, the sender prefers to play the game in which the probability of interrogation is lowest. Also, if we let ∆ = 0 the sender essentially reveals all in the Little Fish game. In this special case, (18) as ∆ increasesAlso notice that increases in  act to increase the relative value of the Big 4 game. Figure 5 shows the relative values obtained by altering  and ; the value of (18) is increasing in  and is invariant to .
Expected Information Gain/Loss
It is also of interest to examine the expected value of the information revealed in each of the two games. The expected value of the information revealed in the Big 4 game is equal the expected value from receiving report 0 [i.e.,  0 (0)] plus the expected value from receiving report 1 [i.e.,  1  (1)], or
The expected value of information revealed in the little fish game is the certain value (0), plus the  11 percent of type 1 individuals revealing signal 1 ( 1  11 ∆) plus the  0 percent of type 1 individuals pursuing strategy  10 who are interrogated and crack
The difference, (20)- (21), in equilibrium, is
The sign is ambiguous. However, if we let  = 0 (22) degenerates into −(1) which is clearly negative. Alternatively, if we let  = 1, (22) can be written as
which is positive. Hence, the expected information gain to the HIC tends to be larger in the Big 4 game (Little Fish) when  is large (small). It is interesting to note that the detainee's government should prefer that they play the Little Fish game when  is high.
This result is surprising in that the governments universally press their soldiers to play the Big 4 game. Nevertheless, this strategy could be against their own interests if  is high. Terrorist groups, on the other hand, do seem content to let their members play the Little Fish game. Figure 5 shows that the differential value of the games decreases in  and in (1). Figure 6 shows that the differential value increases in  and is relatively insensitive to .
Optimal Intensity
Clearly, much of the controversy concerning interrogations involves intensity of the interrogation. One one hand, the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services (2008) reports:
"Experts in the field of interrogation indicate the most effective interrogation strategy is a rapport-building approach. Interrogation techniques that rely on physical or adverse consequences are likely to garner inaccurate information and create an increased level of resistance. . . There is no evidence that the level of fear or discomfort evoked by a given technique has any consistent correlation to the volume or quality of information obtained."
However, in addition to the type of anecdotal evidence provided by Thiessen (2010), Regan (2010) provides econometric evidence that torture acts to prevent subsequent terrorism. Although we do not explicitly model torture, we are interested in the effect of increasing the level of intensity of an interrogation. In our view, sequentially using the methods discussed in the lower portion of Table 1 provides increasing (although diminishing) amounts of additional information. As such, we assume that the HIC can choose the level of intensity () and let  and  be twice-differentiable functions of .
Specifically, the receiver can choose  ∈ (0) where is the maximum intensity level allowed by law. Let
The HIC's Problem
If the receiver in the Big 4 game can choose the optimal level of , he will choose  to maximize
The solution for this optimal level of , called, satisfies
In the Little Fish game, in equilibrium, the HIC's expected utility (EU) is
Taking derivative with respect to  yields
The first-order condition shows that the optimal level of intensity in the Little Fish game,  * , is such that (27) is equal to zero, that is,
The above equation implies that  * is such that the elasticity of  is equal to the elasticity of . Taking derivative of (27) with respect to  yields
which is negative at  * ; the receiver's EU function is concave around  * . To compare  * to, divide (25) by (), so that
Because of (2), we have
Comparing (31) to (28), we find that   * because  is concave and  is convex.
As such, the HIC will use a greater level of intensity in the Big 4 game than in the Little Fish game. The explanation lies in the fact that by receiving information in the first stage of the Little Fish game, the incentive for the HIC to extract the additional information, ∆, is reduced. As such, the level of intensity of the interrogation is reduced as well.
The Social Optimum in the Little Fish Game
The level of intensity selected by the HIC may not be socially optimal if the perceptions of the full cost of an interrogation differs from those of the society. For example, an HIC who focussed on extracting information from a particular detainee may not be concerned about the fact that a harsh interrogation may aid recruiting efforts by the terrorist network. In the extreme, suppose that the interrogator who does not care about the cost of interrogation in (14) is the one who chooses the intensity level. This interrogator will try to maximize the expected information gain from the game. Using (7), (10) , and the fact that  11 = 1 −  10 , the expected information gain, (21), can be written as
Let maximize (32). The derivative of
, which is the difference between (32) and (26), with respect to  can be written as
At  * , (33) becomes
which is positive because  0  2   2 ∆ 0 . Therefore, we find that   * . The point is clear: The level of intensity chosen by the HIC will exceed the socially optimal level.
As such, in order to obtain the social optimum, it is necessary to enforce regulations limiting the intensity of interrogations. Unlike the view of the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services (2008), in our model, the regulations are necessary because harsh interrogations can provide useful information. The fact that harsh methods can "work" means that the HIC needs to be prevented from utilizing such tactics.
Conclusion
We considered two different types of interrogation strategies. In the Big 4 game, detainees provide the interrogator with no more than name, rank, serial number, and date of birth. The interrogator has no way of sorting the detainees and will treat all detainees similarly in that he interrogates everyone or no one. In the 2-stage game, detainees are allowed to provide a small amount of useful information to the interrogator. At this point, the interrogator must decide whether to expend resources so as to try to extract an additional piece of information from the detainee. It turns out that providing a low level information to the interrogator can act as disincentive for additional interrogation.
As such, it is possible that the sender and receiver both prefer the 2-stage game even though the expected amount of information received by the interrogator is lower in the 2-stage game.
Perhaps, the most important result is to formalize the internal conflict between the HIC and the society at large. In a limited sense, the more information that the HIC can extract, the lower the risk of future terrorist attacks. However, as evidenced by the events at Au Ghraib and the controversy surrounding the detainees at Guantanamo Bay, there is a social cost to extremely harsh forms of interrogation. In the context of our model,  represents the full cost of interrogation. As such,  includes the costs involved with the fact that torture is morally offensive and that harsh interrogation methods can serve as a recruiting tool for the terrorists. Rather than being discrete, we allow these costs to be increasing in the level of intensity used by the HIC. The notion is that once the HIC begins to use a Fear Up (Harsh) or a Separation approach, some (but not all) in the society will recoil at the way detainees are treated. Further increases in the level of intensity cause additional moral revulsion. Moreover, once the harsh practices become public knowledge, terrorists will use this information to undermine the moral authority of the interrogating nation. The point is that the marginal social cost of extreme forms of interrogation can exceed the perceived cost to an interrogator focussed only on extracting information from a detainee. As such, it becomes socially optimal for society to impose firm restrictions on the behavior of interrogators. Of course, some will view these restrictions as "tying the government's hands" in the fight against terrorism.
Nevertheless, some restrictions are necessary if HICs select intensity levels such that the marginal value of information obtained exceeds the marginal cost of the interrogation.
It is also the case that the type of interrogation that occurs is important. In the Big 4 game, the HIC selects an intensity level that exceeds the level selected in the Little 
Appendix: Three Sender Types
It is straightforward to generalize the game to allow for multiple players all having different levels of information. In the three-player game, we denote the information set
by Ω = {0 1 2}. The players' strategies are given by
For type 1 sender to mix his strategies, we must have  10 =  11 . Let  1 0 denote the probability of interrogation given report 0 such that  10 =  11 . We have
or equivalently,
The above equation implies that for a given  1 , if the receiver wants type 1 sender to mix his strategies, the receiver must choose  0 =  denote the probability of interrogation given reports 0 and 1 such that  20 =  22 and  21 =  22 , respectively. We have
and
Therefore,
In general, the receiver has to choose  0 =  
We find that (41) - (39) 
In order that the HIC be indifferent between interrogating and not interrogating given the receipt of reports 0 and 1, we must have
Hence
Substituting (44) in (45), we have
On the other hand, let the receiver choose a different strategy  = [ , type 1 sender will always report 0. Upon receiving report 0, the receiver will always interrogate. Upon receiving report 1, the receiver knows with certainty that the sender is of type 2 and hence will always interrogate. Hence, this second strategy is not a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
The point is that the first strategy results in a unique equilibrium. 
EmotionalPride and Ego-Up
Source is flattered into providing information to gain credit and build his ego. Example, the HIC states: "This was a smooth operation. I have seen many previous attempts fail. I bet you planned this. When did you first decide to do the job?" EmotionalPride and Ego-Down HIC attacks the source's ego or self-image. The source, in defending his ego, reveals information to justify or rationalize his actions. Example: "Why did you surrender so easily when you could have escaped by crossing the nearby ford in the river?" EmotionalFutility HIC convinces the source that resistance to questioning is futile. Example "it is hopeless for your forces to continue fighting because they can no longer get supplies, but you can help end the war and their suffering." Establish Your Identity HIC insists the detainee is an infamous individual wanted by higher authorities on serious charges. In an effort to clear himself of this allegation, the source makes a genuine and detailed effort to establish or substantiate his true identity.
THESE THREE APPROACHES REQUIRE ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZATION Mutt and Jeff
Make the source identify with one of the interrogators and thereby establish rapport and cooperation. HIC does not to threaten or coerce the source. Planned use of the Mutt and Jeff approach must be approved by the interrogator's chain of command. False Flag HIC convinces detainee that individuals from a country other than the U.S. are interrogating him, and trick the detainee into cooperating with U.S. forces. For example, making the detainee believe that he is actually talking to representatives from a different country, such as a country that is friendly to the detainee's country or organization. Separation Denies detainee the ability to communicate with others in order to keep him from learning counter-resistance techniques or gathering information to support a cover story. Separation can be used during the interrogation of specific unlawful enemy combatants for whom proper approvals have been granted. It may not be employed on detainees covered by the Geneva Conventions. 
